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Abstract
Demange (2012) generalized the classical single-
crossing property to the intermediate property on
median graphs and proved that the representative
voter theorem still holds for this more general
framework. We complement her result with prov-
ing that the linear orders of any profile which is
intermediate on a median graph form a Condorcet
domain. We prove that for any median graph there
exists a profile that is intermediate with respect to
that graph and that one may need at least as many
alternatives as vertices to construct such a profile.
We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to recog-
nize whether or not a given profile is intermedi-
ate with respect to some median graph. Finally,
we show that finding winners for the Chamberlin-
Courant rule is polynomial-time solvable for pro-
files that are single-crossing on a tree.
1 Introduction
Condorcet’s famous paradox demonstrates that pairwise ma-
jority voting may produce intransitive collective preferences.
The question of whether, and if so, how, this problem can
be overcome by means of restrictions on the domain of ad-
missible individual preferences has attracted constant inter-
est over the recent decades, see [Gaertner, 2001] for a de-
tailed overview. Probably the best-known domain restric-
tion is single-peakedness [Black, 1948] which is frequently
employed in models of political economy. It stipulates that
all alternatives can be arranged along one dimension, for in-
stance according to the political left-right spectrum, so that
each voter has an ideal choice in the set of alternatives and
the alternatives that are further from their ideal choice are
preferred less. The concept of single-peakedness itself can be
generalized considerably, however, the sufficiency of single-
peakedness for transitivity of the (strict) majority relation is
confined to the classical one-dimensional case only.1
A different and frequently useful sufficient condition for
transitivity of the majority relation is the single-crossing
1Single-peakedness on trees still guarantees the existence of a
Condorcet winner, and single-peakedness on a median graph the
existence of a “local” Condorcet winner [Bandelt and Barthe´le´my,
1984].
property [Mirrlees, 1971]. A profile of individual preferences
is said to have the single-crossing property if the voters can
be arranged on a one-dimensional linear spectrum so that, for
all pairs of alternatives (a, b), the set of voters who prefer a to
b and also the set of voters who prefer b to a are both convex.
As shown by Rothstein [1991], every single-crossing profile
has a so-called representative voter, i.e., a voter whose (strict)
preference coincides with the (strict) majority relation.2
Roberts [1977], Blair and Crawford [1984], Gans Smart
[1996] provide a number of economic applications of single-
crossingness among which are voting models of redistributive
income taxation and trade union bargaining. All of them rep-
resent situations when preferences of individuals depend on
a single parameter while in practice we may have a number
of them. So there are compelling economic reasons which
prompt us to consider single-crossingness on graphs more
general than a line. Kung [2014], in particular, argues that
single-crossingness on trees can be applied to the study of
networks.
In contrast to the case of single-peaked preferences, the
sufficiency of the single-crossing property for transitivity of
the strict majority relation generalizes to median graphs [De-
mange, 2012], which, in particular, include trees and lattice
graphs. This generalisation is based on the notion of inter-
mediate preferences [Grandmont, 1978]. Assume that voters
can be indexed by the vertices of a graph, and say that a pro-
file satisfies the intermediateness property (or simply that it
is intermediate) with respect to this graph if, for all pairs of
alternatives (a, b) and any two voters i and j who prefer a to
b, all voters that lie on any shortest path between i and j on
the graph also prefer a to b. Evidently, if the graph is a line, a
profile satisfies the intermediateness property if and only if it
satisfies the single-crossing property.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, we prove
that any profile which is intermediate on a median graph
gives rise to a Condorcet domain. We give a constructive
proof of the existence of an intermediate profile for any me-
dian graph with n vertices (generalising and strengthening
the corresponding result of Kung for trees). We prove that
n alternatives are always sufficient and that there exists a me-
dian graph (actually a tree) for which intermediate profiles
2One can show that such a result does not hold for single-peaked
preferences even on a line.
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with fewer than n alternatives do not exist. We also give
a polynomial-time algorithm that recognizes whether or not
a given profile is intermediate with respect to some median
graph. Finally, we prove that the Chamberlin-Courant multi-
winner voting rule on single-crossing profiles on trees has a
polynomial time winner-determination problem which gener-
alises a similar result of Skowron et al. [2013] for the clas-
sical single-crossing property. The corresponding problem
on median graphs remains open. It is interesting to note that
for the single-peaked property on a tree only the egalitarian
version of the Chamberlin-Courant rule remains polynomial.
The classical utilitarian version of this rule becomes NP-hard
[Yu et al., 2013].
The problem addressed in the present paper is closely re-
lated to the search of maximal Condorcet domains [Abello
and Johnson, 1984; Abello, 1991; Galambos and Reiner,
2008; Danilov et al., 2012]; see also the survey on the topic
in [Monjardet, 2009]. Indeed, any intermediate profile on a
median graph provides us with a new type of Condorcet do-
main (although possibly not maximal).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Linear orders and profiles
Let A and V be two finite sets of cardinality m and n, re-
spectively. The elements of A will be called alternatives, the
elements of V = {1, 2, . . . , n} voters. We assume that the
voters have preferences over the set of alternatives. By Ł(A)
we denote the set of all (strict) linear orders on A; they rep-
resent the preferences of agents over A. The elements of the
Cartesian product Ł(A)n = Ł(A) × . . . × Ł(A) (n times)
are called n-profiles or simply profiles. They represent the
collection of preferences of the voters from V over the alter-
natives fromA. If a linear orderRi represents the preferences
of the i-th voter, then by aRib, where a, b ∈ A, we denote that
this agent prefers a to b. We also denote this as a i b.
Given a profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn), we say that a linear
order Rj is between orders Ri and Rk if a i b and a k b
imply a j b for every pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A. The
set of all linear orders from R that are between Ri and Rk is
denoted [Ri, Rk].
Definition 2.1. Let R = (R1, . . . , Rn) be a profile. The ma-
jority relation M(R) of R over A is the binary relation on
A such that for any a, b ∈ A we have a  b if and only if
|{i | a i b}| ≥ |{i | b i a}|.
We will also write a  b if a  b but not b  a and
call it the strict majority relation. When n is odd, the major-
ity relation coincides with the strict majority relation and is
a tournament on A, i.e., a complete and asymmetric binary
relation.
Definition 2.2. A Condorcet domain is a set of linear orders
C ⊆ Ł(A) such that, no matter how many voters in the profile
P have each of the linear orders from C as their preference
relation, the strict majority relation of P is transitive.
Condorcet domains have long been of interest to Social
Choice scientists and mathematicians alike; see the afore-
mentioned survey by Monjardet. For a detailed discussion
of single-crossing condition see [Bredereck et al., 2013].
2.2 Median Graphs, Geodesic Convexity and
Geodesic Betweenness
Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph. The distance d(u, v)
between two vertices u, v ∈ V will be the smallest number of
edges that a path from u to v may contain. While the distance
is uniquely defined, there may be several shortest paths from
u to v. We say that vertex w is geodesically between vertices
u and v if w lies on a shortest path that connects u and v or,
alternatively, d(u, v) = d(u,w) + d(w, v).
Definition 2.3. A (geodesically) convex set in a graph G =
(V,E) is a subsetC ⊆ V such that for any two vertices u, v ∈
C all vertices of any shortest path between u and v in G lie
entirely in C.
Definition 2.4. A connected graph G = (V,E) is called a
median graph if for any three distinct vertices u, v, w ∈ V
there is a unique vertex m(u, v, w), called median, which lies
on shortest paths from u to v, from u to w and from v to w.
Trees and lattice graphs are examples of median graphs. It
is known that median graphs are bipartite and hence do not
contain triangles [Bandelt and Barthe´le´my, 1984].
To describe the structure of an arbitrary median graph we
remind the concept of convex expansion for graphs.
Definition 2.5. LetG = (V,E) be a graph. LetW1,W2 ⊂ V
be subsets such that W1 ∪W2 = V , W1 ∩W2 6= ∅ and there
are no edges connecting vertices of W1 \W2 and vertices of
W2 \W1. The expansion of G with respect to W1 and W2 is
the graph G′ constructed as follows:
• each vertex v ∈W1∩W2 is replaced by two vertices v1,
v2 joined by an edge;
• v1 is joined to the neighbours of v in W1 \W2 and v2 is
joined to the neighbours of v in W2 \W1;
• if v, w ∈W1 ∩W2 and vw ∈ E, then v1 is joined to w1
and v2 is joined to w2.
If W1 and W2 are convex, then G′ will be called a convex
expansion of G.
Example 2.6 (Convex expansion). In the graph G shown
on the left of the following figure we set W1 = {a, b, c, d}
and W2 = {c, d, e, f}. These are convex and their intersec-
tion W1 ∩ W2 = {c, d} is not empty. Also the vertices of
W1 \ W2 = {a, b} and W2 \ W1 = {e, f} have no edges
between them. On the right we see the graph G′ obtained by
the convex expansion of G with respect to W1 and W2.
The following important theorem about median graphs is
due to Mulder [1978].
Theorem 2.7 (Mulder’s convex expansion theorem). A graph
is a median graph if it can be obtained from a trivial one-
vertex graph by repeated convex expansions.
3 Intermediateness property
Let G = (V,E) be a graph with V = {1, . . . , n} and R =
(R1, . . . , Rn) be a profile. We will consider the linear orders
of R as indexed by vertices of G.
Theorem 3.1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with V =
{1, . . . , n} and R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Ł(A)n be a profile.
The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Rj is between Ri and Rk whenever j is geodesically
between i and k;
(ii) for every ordered pair of alternatives (a, b) ∈ A2 the set
Vab = {i ∈ V | a i b} is convex in G;
(iii) for every shortest path i1, . . . , ik in G between i1 and
ik the profile (Ri1 , . . . , Rik) is classical single-crossing
profile relative to the order of voters determined by that
path.
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii). Let i, k ∈ Vab. Consider j on any shortest
path from i to k. Then by (i) Rj is between Ri and Rk and
since i and k agree on the pair a, b we have a j b, whence
j ∈ Vab.
(ii) ⇒ (iii). Let I = {i1, . . . , ik} As I is a shortest path
and Vab is convex, then Vab ∩ I is a subpath. But Vba ∩ I is
also a subpath and this can happen only when there exists `
such that Vab = {i1, . . . , i`} and Vba = {i`+1, . . . , k}.
(iii) ⇒ (i). Follows from properties of classical single-
crossing profiles.
Definition 3.2. The profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn) is said to be
intermediate on the graphG = (V,E) if one of the equivalent
conditions (i) - (iii) of Theorem 3.1 holds.
Let us consider several examples.
Example 3.3. (a) Classical single-crossingness. A classical
single-crossing profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn) is intermediate on
a path:
(b) Single-crossing on a tree. Consider the profile R =
(R1, R2, R3, R4) on the set {a, b, c, d} consisting of the fol-
lowing four orders: R1 = acbd, R2 = abcd, R3 = abdc,
and R4 = bacd. As is easily seen, this profile is intermediate
(single-crossing) on the following tree:
(c) Intermediate profile on a lattice graph. The following
profile R is made of a set of linear orders which is a maximal
Condorcet domain: R1 := abcd, R2 := abdc, R3 := bacd,
R4 := badc, R5 := cdab, R6 := dcab, R7 := cdba, R8 :=
dcba. It can be checked that R is intermediate on the cube:
Definition 3.4. Let P ∈ Ł(A)n be a profile which is interme-
diate on a median graph G = (V,E) and a, b ∈ A. An edge
uv ∈ E is said to be an ab-cut if a u b and b v a.
Unlike for trees an ab-cut may not be unique (although
[Demange, 2012] claims that it is). Given an edge e let us
denote S(e) = {(a, b) ∈ A2 | e is an ab-cut}.
Lemma 3.5. Let P be a profile which is intermediate on a
median graph G = (V,E). An edge e = uv ∈ E is an ab-
cut if and only if Vab = {w ∈ V | d(w, u) < d(w, v)}, and
Vba = {w ∈ V | d(w, u) > d(w, v)}.
Proof. Let w ∈ Vab. Then, due to intermediateness, among
w, u, v only u can be the median. Hence wuv is the shortest
path from w to v and d(w, u) = d(w, v) − 1 and d(w, u) <
d(w, v). The converse is clear.
Corollary 3.6. Let P be a profile which is intermediate on
a median graph G = (V,E). Suppose e1, . . . , ek ∈ E are
ab-cuts. Then S(e1) = . . . = S(ek).
Proof. Suppose e1 = u1v1 is an ab-cut and also a cd-cut.
Then by Lemma 3.5 Vab = Vcd and Vba = Vdc. Since ei =
uivi is an ab-cut, then ui ∈ Vab = Vcd and vi ∈ Vba = Vdc.
Hence ei is also a cd-cut.
We need the following technical lemma now.
Lemma 3.7. Let P = (P k11 , . . . , P knn ) be a profile, where
linear order Pi is repeated ki times and Pi 6= Pj if i 6= j.
If P is intermediate on a median graph G, then the profile
Pˆ = (P1, . . . , Pn) is also intermediate on a median graph.
Proof. Any two identical linear orders are either neighbors in
G or connected by a path of vertices with identical linear or-
ders. Contracting them to a single vertex results in the graph
sought for.
Let P be a profile. By D(P ) we denote the set of all dis-
tinct linear orders present in P . If all linear orders of P are
different, we call the profile P reduced.
Theorem 3.8. Let P be a profile which is intermediate with
respect to a median graph G = (V,E). Then D(P ) is a
Condorcet domain.
Proof. By Lemma 3.7 we may assume that the profile P
is reduced. Let Q = (Qs11 , . . . , Q
sm
m ) be a profile with
Qi ∈ D(P ) and Qi 6= Qj for all i 6= j. We can
add linear orders Qm+1, . . . , Qn so that the extended profile
Q̂ = (Q1, . . . , Qn) is intermediate on a median graph G =
(V̂ , E), where V̂ = {1, . . . , n} (renumeration of vertices
may be necessary). We will also denote V = {1, . . . ,m}.
Suppose that a  b and b  c, where  is the majority
relation for Q. Then we have two partitions of V , namely,
V = Vab ∪ Vba and V = Vbc ∪ Vcb. We have |Vab| > |Vba|
and |Vbc| > |Vcb|. Obviously, Vabc = Vab ∩ Vbc 6= ∅ since
each of these sets contains a majority of voters in V . We have
Vab ⊆ V̂ab and Vbc ⊆ V̂bc, where V̂xy = {i ∈ V̂ | x i y}.
We cannot claim that V̂ab or V̂bc contains more than half of
all elements of V̂ but we know that V̂ab ∩ V̂bc ⊇ Vabc 6= ∅.
Consider now V̂ac and V̂ca. Suppose there are several edges
es = usvs (s = 1, . . . , t), connecting them; all of them are
ac-cuts. Suppose V̂ac ∩ V̂ab 6= ∅ and V̂ca ∩ V̂ab 6= ∅. Then
for any p ∈ V̂ac ∩ V̂ab and q ∈ V̂ca ∩ V̂ab the shortest path
between them includes one of the ac-cuts, say ei = uivi. This
means that a ui b and a vi b. But then it is not possible to
have V̂ac ∩ V̂bc 6= ∅ and V̂ca ∩ V̂bc 6= ∅ since in this case we
would have b ui c and b vi c and by transitivity a ui c
and a vi c which contradicts to ei being an ac-cut. Since
∅ 6= Vabc ⊆ V̂ac∩ V̂bc, we have V̂ca∩ V̂bc = ∅ and Vbc ⊆ Vac.
This means a  c and  is transitive.
Now we are going to prove that for any median graph we
can construct a reduced profile which is intermediate on that
particular graph. We then discuss how many alternatives may
be needed.
Theorem 3.9. For every median graph G = (V,E) with
|V | = n there exists a reduced preference profile R =
(R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Ł(Y )n on a set of alternatives Y with
|Y | ≤ n such that R is intermediate on G.
Proof. Since the statement is true for the trivial graph consist-
ing of a single vertex, arguing by induction, we assume that
the statement is true for all median graphs with k vertices or
less. Let G′ = (V ′, E′) be a median graph with |V ′| = k+1.
By Mulder’s theorem G′ is a convex expansion of a certain
median graph G = (V,E) relative to convex subsets W1 and
W2, where |V | = ` ≤ k. By induction there exists a reduced
profile R = (R1, . . . , R`) ∈ Ł(X)` with |X| ≤ k which is
intermediate on G.
To obtain a new profile R′ which is intermediate on G′ we
clone an arbitrary alternative x ∈ X and introduce a clone
y /∈ X of x.3 The linear orders of the new profile R′ will be
constructed as follows. If v is a vertex of W1 \W2 to obtain
R′v we replace x with xy in Rv placing y lower than x and
to obtain R′u for u ∈ W2 \W1 we replace x with yx in Ru
placing y higher than x. Let v now be in W1 ∩W2. In the
convex expansion this vertex is split into v1 and v2. To obtain
R′v1 we clone the linear order Rv replacing x with xy and
to obtain R′v2 we clone the same linear order Rv replacing x
with yx. We have Y = X∪{y} so the number of alternatives
has increased by one, so it is not greater than k + 1 = |V ′|.
The profile R′, so obtained, is also reduced.
To prove thatR′ is intermediate onG′. we need to consider
several cases. For example, let u ∈ W1 \W2 and v ∈ W2 \
W1 and let us prove that all linear orders on a shortest path
between u and v are between R′u and R
′
v . Firstly, we note
that any such shortest path will contain an edge e = w1w2,
where w ∈ W1 ∩W2. There is the corresponding path in G,
3We say that x and y are clones if they are neighbours in any
linear order of the domain (cf. Elkind et al (2011) and (2012)).
where the edge e is contracted to w and all linear orders on
that path are between Ru and Rv . The way we placed y in
these linear orders will not disturb the betweenness since all
linear orders R′z between R
′
u and Rw1 (inclusive) will have
x ′z y and all others will have y ′z x. All other cases are
considered similarly.
The constant n in this theorem cannot be improved even
for trees. However we must exclude some trivial cases. For
example, if all the linear orders in a profile are equal, then it
is intermediate for any graph. So we have to restrict ourselves
to reduced profiles.
Theorem 3.10. For the star Sn with n vertices (the complete
bipartite graph K1,n−1) there does not exist a reduced profile
R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Ł(X)n on the set X of alternatives of
cardinality smaller than n which is intermediate on Sn.
Proof. We reason by induction on n. The base case is the star
S2 with two vertices for which the result is clear.
Let us assume that for Sn, n ≥ 2, we cannot construct a
reduced profile with less than n alternatives which is interme-
diate on Sn. Consider Sn+1 and suppose towards a contradic-
tion that we can find a reduced profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn+1)
with n alternatives which is intermediate on Sn+1. Suppose
that the vertices of Sn+1 are numbered so that voter 1’s vertex
has degree n and voter 1 has preferences expressed by the lin-
ear order a1 1 a2 1 . . . 1 an. Suppose, first, that s is the
smallest number for which one of the edges, say the one con-
necting 1 with n+1, is an a1as-cut for Sn+1; if such a number
does not exist, a1 can be removed from the profile and it will
stay reduced. Then as n+1 a1 and a1 i as for all i ≤ n
(otherwise intermediateness fails). Let us remove now vertex
n + 1 from the graph and linear order Pn+1 from the profile.
Then we get graph Sn and the profile P ′ = (P1, . . . , Pn)
which is intermediate on Sn. No edge in Sn is an a1as-cut
now. Let us now remove the alternative a1 from P ′ to obtain
a profile P ′′ = (P ′′1 , . . . , P
′′
n ). Then P
′′ is still intermediate
on the star Sn and we claim that P ′′ is reduced. If not, then
after removal of a1, at least two linear orders, say P ′′i and P
′′
k
become equal. If i = 1, then the only cut the edge 1k had was
an a1at-cut for some t > s. Then we had at k a1 k as
while as 1 at; so we see that 1k had also a asat-cut. This
contradicts P ′′1 = P
′′
k .
Now suppose P ′′i = P
′′
k with i 6= 1 and k 6= 1. Then Pi
and Pk must agree on a2, . . . , an. Due to intermediateness
they must also agree with P1 on these, i.e., a2 i . . . i an
and a2 k . . . k an. Since a1 cannot be on the top of
each of them (otherwise one would be equal to P1) we have
a2 i a1 and a2 k a1, which contradicts intermediateness.
Hence P ′′ is reduced. Since P ′′ has n− 1 alternatives, this
is a contradiction.
4 Algorithmic aspects of single-crossedness
4.1 A recognition algorithm.
The goal of this section is to give a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for recognising intermediate profiles on median graphs.
We need to know more about the structure of intermediate
profiles on median graphs.
Theorem 4.1. Let R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Ł(A)n be a profile
whose linear orders are indexed by the vertices of graph G =
(V,E). Let a, b ∈ A be a pair of alternatives such that ∅ 6=
Vab 6= V . Let also ei = uivi, i = 1, . . . , s be the edges that
connect Vab and Vba with ui ∈ Vab and vi ∈ Vba. Then G is
a median graph and R is intermediate on G iff
(i) u1, . . . , us are all distinct and so are v1, . . . , vs;
(ii) S(e1) = . . . = S(es);
(iii) Induced graphs on Vab and Vba are median graphs in
their own right;
(iv) Rab = {Ru | u ∈ Vab} and Rba = {Rv | v ∈ Vab}
are the profiles which are intermediate on Vab and Vba,
respectively;
(v) Let G¯ be the graph G with edges e1, . . . , es contracted.
Let V¯ab and V¯ba be images of Vab and Vba in G¯. Then G
is the convex expansion of G¯ with respect to V¯ab and V¯ba.
Proof. =⇒ (i) Suppose vi = vj , then ui 6= uj and (a, b) ∈
S(ei) = S(ej). Since G is bipartite it has no triangles, hence
uiviuj is the shortest path between ui and uj . This contra-
dicts to intermediateness since Rui and Ruj agree on (a, b)
but Rvi disagrees with them.
(ii) is Corollary 3.6.
(iii) Follows from an observation that a shortest path be-
tween vertices w,w′ ∈ Vab cannot involve any of e1, . . . , es
and hence lies entirely in Vab.
(iv) and (v) are now obvious.
⇐= Firstly, G is median due to Mulder’s theorem. To
check intermediateness, let us consider a shortest path be-
tween u and v from V . If they are both in Vab or Vba, this
case is clear. Suppose u ∈ Vab and v ∈ Vba and they agree on
(c, d) for some c, d ∈ A. The shortest path between u and v
contains one of the edges e1, . . . , es, say ei so it goes through
vertices u, ui, vi, v. Since elements of Vcd are found both in
Vab and Vba by Lemma 3.5 we cannot have (c, d) ∈ S, where
S = S(e1) = . . . = S(es). Thus both c ui d and c vi d.
The part of the path connecting u and ui is the shortest path
in Vab so all linear orders on this path agree with u and ui on
(c, d). So do the linear orders on the path from vi to v. This
proves the theorem.
The idea of the recognition algorithm is now clear. We
give the construction only for a reduced profile R =
(R1, . . . , Rn). The order of linear orders in the profile
can be ignored so we actually deal with the domain D =
{R1, . . . , Rn}. Firstly, we identify the graph GD to be tested.
For this we find all pairs of ‘neighboring’ linear orders. Any
two linear orders P,Q ∈ D define the ‘interval’ [P,Q] as the
set of all linear orders in D which are between P and Q and
call P and Q neighbors if [P,Q] = {P,Q}. We draw edges
between the neighboring orders and obtain the graph GD on
linear orders from D. The construction of this graph requires
O(m2n3) operations, where m is the number of alternatives.
If R was intermediate on a median graph G, then GD is
exactly G. Indeed, if u and v were neighbors in G, then
[Ru, Rv] = {Ru, Rv}. If only Rw ∈ [Ru, Rv] for w 6= u
and w 6= v, then, since u and v are neighbors, the median
m(u, v, w) is either u or v. Suppose m(u, v, w) = u. Then,
due to intermediateness, Ru is between Rw and Rv from
which Rw = Ru. On the other hand, if u and v are not neigh-
bors in G, then it is easy to see that [Ru, Rv] 6= {Ru, Rv}.
We then pick any pair (a, b) ∈ A for which Vab and Vba are
both nonempty and select edges ei = uivi, i = 1, . . . , s of
GD. If all ui’s and all vi’s are different, and S(e1) = . . . =
S(es), then the question of whether or not R is intermedi-
ate on GD will be reduced to the questions of whether or not
Rab = {Ru | u ∈ Vab} and Rba = {Rv | v ∈ Vba} are inter-
mediate on graphs induced on Vab and Vba, respectively. This
can be arranged as a recursive algorithm. We have proved
Theorem 4.2. For an input profile with n voters and m alter-
natives we can determine in time polynomial in m,n whether
or not the given profile is intermediate on some median graph,
and, if so, construct this graph.
4.2 Chamberlin-Courant rule
This section deals with single-crossing profiles on trees.
Given a society of n voters V with preferences over a
set of m candidates A and a fixed positive integer k ≤ m,
a method of fully proportional representation outputs a k-
member committee (e.g., parliament), which is a subset of A,
and assigns to each voter a candidate that will represent this
voter in the committee. The fully proportional representation
rules, suggested by Chamberlin and Courant [1983] and Mon-
roe [1995], have been widely discussed in Political Science
and Social Choice literature alike [Potthof and Brams, 1998;
Meir et al., 2008; Betzler et al., 2013].
It is well-known that on an unrestricted domain of pref-
erences both rules are intractable in the classical [Meir et
al., 2008; Lu and Boutilier, 2011] and parameterized com-
plexity [Betzler et al., 2013] senses. [Skowron et al., 2013],
however, showed that for the classical single-crossing elec-
tions the winner-determination problem for the Chamberlin-
Courant rule is polynomial-time solvable for every dissat-
isfaction function for both the utilitarian [Chamberlin and
Courant, 1983] and egalitarian [Betzler et al., 2013] ver-
sions of the rule. They also generalized this result to
elections with bounded single-crossing width proving fixed-
parameter tractability of the Chamberlin-Courant rule with
single-crossing width as parameter. The concept of single-
peaked width was defined in [Cornaz et al., 2012].
Here we will prove that polynomial solvability remains
for single-crossing profiles on any tree. But, firstly, we will
remind the reader the definitions needed for discussing the
Chamberlin-Courant rule. By posv(c) we denote the position
of the alternative c in the ranking of voter v; the top-ranked
alternative has position 1, the second best has position 2, etc.
Definition 4.3. Given a profile P over set A of alternatives,
a mapping r : P × A → Q+0 is called a misrepresentation
function if for any voter v ∈ V and candidates c, c′ ∈ A the
condition posv(c) < posv(c
′) implies r(v, c) ≤ r(v, c′).
In the classical framework the misrepresentation of a can-
didate for a voter is a function of the position of the can-
didate in the preference order of that voter given by s =
(s1, . . . , sm), where 0 = s1 ≤ s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sm, that is,
the misrepresentation function in this case will be r(v, c) =
sposv(c). Such a misrepresentation function is called posi-
tional. An important case is the Borda misrepresentation
function defined by the vector (0, 1, . . . ,m − 1) which was
used in [Chamberlin and Courant, 1983]. We assume that the
misrepresentation function is defined for any number of alter-
natives and that it is polynomial-time computable.
In the approval voting framework, if a voter is represented
by a candidate whom she approves, her misrepresentation is
zero, otherwise it is equal to one. This function is called the
approval misrepresentation function. It does not have to be
positional since different voters may approve different num-
bers of candidates. In the general framework the misrepre-
sentation function may be arbitrary.
By w : V → A we denote the function that assigns vot-
ers to representatives, i.e., under this assignment voter v is
represented by candidate w(v). If |w(V )| ≤ k we call it a k-
assignment. The total misrepresentation Φ(P,w) of the given
election under w is then given by Φ(P,w) = `(r(v, w(v))),
where ` is used to mean either the sum or the maximum of a
given list of values depending on the utilitarian or egalitarian
model, respectively.
The Chamberlin-Courant rule takes the profile and the
number of representatives to be elected k as input and outputs
an optimal k-assignment wopt of voters to representatives that
minimizes the total misrepresentation Φ(P,w).
Theorem 4.4. For any polynomial-time computable dissatis-
faction function, every positive integer k, and for both util-
itarian and egalitarian versions of the Chamberlin-Courant
rule, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that given a pro-
file P = (P1, . . . , Pn) over a set of alternatives A =
{a1, . . . , am}, which is single-crossing with respect to some
tree, finds an optimal k-assignment function wopt for P .
Lemma 4.5. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a reduced profile over
a set A = {a1, . . . , am} of alternatives, where P is single-
crossing with respect to a tree T . Let wopt be an optimal k-
assignment for P . Let voter 1 be an arbitrary vertex of T ,
and let b ∈ A be the least preferred alternative of voter 1
in wopt(V ). Then the vertices of w−1opt (b) are vertices of a
terminal subtree (a subtree whose vertex-complement is also
a subtree) of T .
Proof. On a tree T we may define the distance between any
two vertices u and v which is the number of edges on the
unique path connecting these two vertices. Let v be the clos-
est vertex to 1 such that wopt(v) = b. Let u be the vertex on
that path which is one edge closer to 1 (it can be actually 1
itself). Due to minimality of T the edge (u, v) is an (a, b)-
cut for some a = wopt(u) where a 1 b. Let us show that
w−1opt (b) = Vba. Suppose first that wopt(v′) = b. Then b v′ a
(otherwise v′ would be assigned a) and hence v′ ∈ Vba. Sup-
pose now v′ ∈ Vba. Then v′ is connected by a path within
Vba, hence the unique path between 1 and v′ passes through
v. Since linear orders on this path form a classical single
crossing subprofile we have wopt(v′) = b.
The fact that the least preferred alternative of voter 1 in the
elected committee w(V ) represents voters in a terminal sub-
tree of T is important in our design of a dynamic program-
ming algorithm. We will fix an arbitrary leaf, without loss of
generality it will be voter 1, and reduce the problem of calcu-
lating an optimal assignment for a profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn)
over a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am} to a partially or-
dered set of subproblems which will be defined shortly. Let
us denote the original problem as (P,A, k). We define the
set of subproblems as follows. A triple (P ′, A′, k′), where
k′ ≤ k is a positive integer, P ′ is a subprofile of P and A′ is
a subset of A is a subproblem of (P,A, k) if
1. P ′ = Pab, the subprofile of linear orders corresponding
to the subset of vertices Vab ⊆ V , where a 1 b;
2. A′ = {a1, . . . , aj} for some positive integer j such that
k ≤ j ≤ n;
3. the goal is to find an optimal assignment w′ : Vab → A′
with |w′(Vab)| ≤ k′.
The idea behind this definition is based on Lemma 4.5.
Namely, we can try to guess the least preferred alternative
of voter 1 in the elected committee aj and the terminal sub-
tree Vba whose voters are all assigned to aj , then the problem
will be reduced to choosing a committee of size k− 1 among
{a1, . . . , aj−1} given the profile Pab of voters corresponding
to Vab. We note that there are at most n − 1 subproblems.
Note that our cuts can be naturally ordered: we can say that
ab-cut ⊂ cd-cut if and only if Vab ⊂ Vcd.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. The tree T with respect to which P
is single-crossing can be computed in polynomial time, by
Theorem 4.2. We can identify one of the leaves then. Let this
be voter 1 with preferences a1 1 · · · 1 am.
For every ab-cut, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and t ∈ {1, . . . , k} we
defineA[Vab, j, t] to be the optimal dissatisfaction (calculated
in the utilitarian or egalitarian way) that can be achieved with
a t-assignment function when considering a subprofile P ′ =
{Pab | 1 ∈ Vab} over A′ = {a1, . . . , aj}. It is clear that for
V ⊆ V , j ∈M \{1} and t ∈ K\{1}, the following recursive
relation holds
A[V, j, t] =min
{
A[V, j − 1, t],min
ab-cut
`(A[Vab, j − 1, t− 1],
(r(vi, aj))vi∈Vba)
}
.
Here ` is used to mean either the sum or the maximum of a
given list of values depending on the utilitarian or egalitarian
model, respectively. To account for the possibility that aj is
not elected in the optimal solution, we also include the term
A[V, j−1, t]. Thus,A[V,m, k] is then the optimal dissatisfac-
tion, and in calculating it we simultaneously find the optimal
k-assignment function.
The following base cases are sufficient for the recursion to
be well-defined
• A[∅, j, t] = 0;
• A[V, j, 1] = min
j′≤j
`((r(vi, aj′))i∈V );
• A[V, j, t] = 0 for t ≥ j.
These conditions suffice for our recursion to be well-
defined. Using dynamic programming, we can compute in
polynomial time, in fact, in time O(mn2k), the optimal dis-
satisfaction of the voters and the assignment that achieves it.
Note that the complexity is the same as for the classical case
in [Skowron et al., 2013] which we closely followed.
5 Conclusion
This paper generalises the classical single-crossing property
to an intermediate property on median graphs and, in particu-
lar, to trees. We complement Demange’s representative voter
theorem with the fact that the set of linear orders of any inter-
mediate profile on a median graph is a Condorcet domain.
We prove that, for any median graph, there exists a pro-
file of preferences which is intermediate with respect to that
particular graph. Finally we present two results on algorith-
mic aspects of single-crossedness. The first one states that
recognising intermediateness on median graphs is possible in
polynomial time, and the second shows that the winner de-
termination problem for the Chamberlin-Courant rule is also
polynomial for single-crossing profiles on trees. We do not
know whether or not this latest result can be extended to in-
termediate profiles on median graphs.
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